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Post by kevin5345179 on Oct 21, 2019 17:43:50 GMT 1
what else can go wrong ?
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Post by kevin5345179 on Oct 22, 2019 22:52:54 GMT 1
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Post by airboche on Oct 23, 2019 10:12:06 GMT 1
The 777-9 is delayed because of the engines - as far as it is known.
The NMA is more of a production strategy and cost problem. That would be above BCA level but group level to decide about.
I think Boeing should do more classic program planning and launching again. They will need investor's greenlight to spend more on more structured new developments again.
Beefing up oldies doesn't cut it (except for the 737NG and A321neo). This still goes for all manufacturers.
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mjoelnir
in service - 2 years
Posts: 4,089
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Post by mjoelnir on Oct 23, 2019 13:58:30 GMT 1
The 777-9 is delayed because of the engines - as far as it is known. The NMA is more of a production strategy and cost problem. That would be above BCA level but group level to decide about. I think Boeing should do more classic program planning and launching again. They will need investor's greenlight to spend more on more structured new developments again. Beefing up oldies doesn't cut it (except for the 737NG and A321neo). This still goes for all manufacturers. The point to the 777-9 (or the whole X) and NMA is very aggressive planing regarding time. No built in time for eventual delays. If program after program is delayed, was the planing right in the beginning? I could well imagine that the NMA will die with the removal of Kevin McAllister. Boeing has to close all open threads first and than count their money. I still think the worst decision at Boeing is blowing all that money on share buybacks. In the near future they could use all that capital. In regards to McAllister, there are some stories around regarding very unsatisfied customers, how and when they can expect compensation and in what form that compensation could materialize. The guy is numbers driven. Perhaps his firing has nothing to do with the status of the programs, but with his handling of customers. |
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Baroque
in service - 2 years
Posts: 3,991
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Post by Baroque on Oct 23, 2019 15:38:36 GMT 1
The point to the 777-9 (or the whole X) and NMA is very aggressive planing regarding time. No built in time for eventual delays. If program after program is delayed, was the planing right in the beginning? Back in 2013 when the 777X was formally launched after much discussions, I did believe that a 7 year development time to 2020 was doable with some buffer built in as well (some reports mentioned that internally Boeing could have been aiming for 2019). I thought it was Boeing becoming more realistic with the timelines after the 787 fiasco whose original development time was to be 4 years from formal launch to first delivery. And we're talking about a derivative with scaled up 787 style wings and new engines developed as an evolution to the GEnx. But evidently, now we see that Boeing/GE screwed up again big time and given the MAX fallout, they're going to have to watch their step on quick shortcuts and fixes. Boeing has been pushing this legacy metal fuselage to try and keep pace with the composite competitor, like enlarged window cutouts, thinner frames and higher cabin pressure and humidity. Hope nothing adverse turns up later in the game... |
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mjoelnir
in service - 2 years
Posts: 4,089
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Post by mjoelnir on Oct 23, 2019 15:59:18 GMT 1
The point to the 777-9 (or the whole X) and NMA is very aggressive planing regarding time. No built in time for eventual delays. If program after program is delayed, was the planing right in the beginning? Back in 2013 when the 777X was formally launched after much discussions, I did believe that a 7 year development time to 2020 was doable with some buffer built in as well (some reports mentioned that internally Boeing could have been aiming for 2019). I thought it was Boeing becoming more realistic with the timelines after the 787 fiasco whose original development time was to be 4 years from formal launch to first delivery. And we're talking about a derivative with scaled up 787 style wings and new engines developed as an evolution to the GEnx. But evidently, now we see that Boeing/GE screwed up again big time and given the MAX fallout, they're going to have to watch their step on quick shortcuts and fixes. Boeing has been pushing this legacy metal fuselage to try and keep pace with the composite competitor, like enlarged window cutouts, thinner frames and higher cabin pressure and humidity. Hope nothing adverse turns up later in the game... Perhaps far to ambitious while not doing a clean sheet. Keeping the fuselage the same could have avoided a lot of problems. I would assume the cargo door would not have popped. And in regards to the 737MAX, the time was not especially short, I think the problem was rather the limitations Boeing put themselves on the changes, leading to problems. (like for example keeping the same type certificate) |
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Post by marlibu on Oct 23, 2019 17:32:20 GMT 1
these are going to be some really tough years for Boeing...ouch!!!! Hindsight is 20/20 vision...
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Post by airboche on Oct 26, 2019 17:43:30 GMT 1
They should have done some clean sheet 787-style new single aisle early and maybe build on the 737NG cheap to bridge sales until EIS of the new single aisle.
The CSeries has proven how much better current engines with a new wing and fuselage are. It's just deliberately sized too small to not interfere with the big guys when Bombardier had to walk alone.
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philidor
in service - 6 years
Posts: 8,950
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Post by philidor on Oct 27, 2019 11:35:20 GMT 1
They should have done some clean sheet 787-style new single aisle early and maybe build on the 737NG cheap to bridge sales until EIS of the new single aisle. The CSeries has proven how much better current engines with a new wing and fuselage are. It's just deliberately sized too small to not interfere with the big guys when Bombardier had to walk alone. Well, you could alternatively reach the opposite conclusion. - The CSeries almost bankrupted Bombardier, which had to be bailed out by Quebec. The financial and commercial failure of the programme shows that a huge investment to secure a small competitive advantage is an unsound strategy when your competitor can launch a quick and comparatively cheap update of an existing aircraft. - Before beeing a success, the 787 was a terrible drain on Boeing's ressources ; it was several years late and tenths of billion dollars over budget, but Boeing was saved by its very strong financial footing : the programme was turned around. - While Boeing was working on a clean-sheet 737 successor, Airbus launched the A320neo. Most Boeing's customers then made it clear they weren't waiting for a Boeing brand new (and expensive) design, they had rather buy the cheap and quickly re-engined Airbus A320neo. Boeing had no choice ! Now, if you look at the question from the security angle, why would a new design be a less risky undertaking than the improvement of an old one ? You never know what happens : in its early days, the 787 came close to a catastrophic fire ... |
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mjoelnir
in service - 2 years
Posts: 4,089
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Post by mjoelnir on Oct 27, 2019 12:43:56 GMT 1
They should have done some clean sheet 787-style new single aisle early and maybe build on the 737NG cheap to bridge sales until EIS of the new single aisle. The CSeries has proven how much better current engines with a new wing and fuselage are. It's just deliberately sized too small to not interfere with the big guys when Bombardier had to walk alone. Well, you could alternatively reach the opposite conclusion. - The CSeries almost bankrupted Bombardier, which had to be bailed out by Quebec. The financial and commercial failure of the programme shows that a huge investment to secure a small competitive advantage is an unsound strategy when your competitor can launch a quick and comparatively cheap update of an existing aircraft. - Before beeing a success, the 787 was a terrible drain on Boeing's ressources ; it was several years late and tenths of billion dollars over budget, but Boeing was saved by its very strong financial footing : the programme was turned around. - While Boeing was working on a clean-sheet 737 successor, Airbus launched the A320neo. Most Boeing's customers then made it clear they weren't waiting for a Boeing brand new (and expensive) design, they had rather buy the cheap and quickly re-engined Airbus A320neo. Boeing had no choice ! Now, if you look at the question from the security angle, why would a new design be a less risky undertaking than the improvement of an old one ? You never know what happens : in its early days, the 787 came close to a catastrophic fire ... Boeing has spent nearly 55 billion USD on share buy backs during the years. IMO that is a strange way to use cash in a technological field, where you need huge amounts of it while developing the next generations of product. Without this strange behavior, Boeing would have huge amounts of equity and own cash, while being free from the need to lend money somewhere. At least it would have been enough to finance one or two extra clean sheet developments, without breaking out in sweat. |
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