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Post by airboche on Feb 3, 2015 16:22:41 GMT 1
We have had some uncomfortable increase in lost aircraft, unknown crash reasons, a lost widebody flight, and possibly eroding manual flying skills recently. If an accident like this is not openly dicussed how can a future flying public in SE Asia and elsewhere be confident enough about this means of transportation?
I agree that it should be sensible, respectful and everything but witholding things that are -as we know- already known internally should not be today's style. The public trusts these authorities and their regulations so they must know what happened. The passengers as customers must know.
Keeping things quiet will just lead to wilder and wilder speculation and more damage below the line. Just look at all those forums. I'd say the Americans have found a good standard to talk about things. Unfortunately the Asians haven't yet.
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Baroque
in service - 2 years
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Post by Baroque on Feb 3, 2015 18:25:20 GMT 1
I sort of have mixed feelings on this. Sure I would like to know what happened and the facts so far. But unless there's an issue that affects me as a as passenger in the near term, there's nothing in it for me to know ASAP the details of the investigation and I can wait for the final report instead. Whether they release the facts now or later, rumours and misinformation will still be prevalent, even after the final report is issued (look at AF447!). So that is unavoidable, no matter what.
For now, I trust the investigative bodies and involved parties have a good understanding of the facts to conclude that this won't affect the flying public on their next flight...
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Post by airboche on Feb 4, 2015 11:47:54 GMT 1
It's perfectly okay to keep any in depth investigation's detail out of the public view until the final report is out. My point is more to tell the public in general what basically happened faster. Weather? Maintenance? Handling? Not so much of a blame game more just the basic infos. That will be enough. I support letting the investigators do their detail work behind closed doors. To tell the public absolutley nothing is just not enough.
From A-net: Details from the preliminary report:
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sciing
in service - 1 year
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Post by sciing on Dec 1, 2015 9:52:30 GMT 1
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Taliesin
Final Assembly Line stage 1
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Post by Taliesin on Dec 3, 2015 3:27:19 GMT 1
Even before AF447, this accident would have been shocking, but after? In another forum, I speculated that this accident would be eerily reminiscent of AF447, it seems I was right in the worst way. If you look at the pilot inputs, one really wonders what these people were doing inside the cockpit of an airplane. On another forum, a former pilot equates the pilots' action with a bus driver, who driving down a winding road, simply gets up and leaves his seat. The pilot inputs from the final report aren't even close to a correct response: Full back stick, while the stall warning is going off CONTINUOUSLY for 3 minutes and 11 seconds... this is pilot incompetence on a level I didn't think was possible.
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Baroque
in service - 2 years
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Post by Baroque on Dec 3, 2015 5:16:59 GMT 1
Full back stick, while the stall warning is going off CONTINUOUSLY for 3 minutes and 11 seconds... this is pilot incompetence on a level I didn't think was possible. Yeah, I thought AF447 ranked pretty high on pilot incompetence, but this has got to take it to another level. It's as if he was shell-shocked by the upset that he became unresponsive to the situation. In the case of AF447, wasn't there a little confusion in the cockpit when the stall warning intermittently went off when the angle of attack readings became invalid and came back on when the nose was lowered?
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philidor
in service - 6 years
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Post by philidor on Dec 3, 2015 7:40:24 GMT 1
So many different issues are pointed out in the accident report !
- First, we have a maintenance issue : the same message kept popping up (23 times in one year !) and was treated as just a nuisance. Nobody took care to look for the root cause, which was identified after the crash as dammaged soldering.
- We also have a crew which was never trained for high-altitude upset recovery, as has been advised at least since AF 447.
- Then we have a captain who thinks he can repeat in flight what he has seen an engineer do on the ground, and goes on pulling circuit-breakers on two computers, unaware of the consequences.
- Then we have a second-in-command who does not know how to react to a developping stall, and a captain giving confusing verbal commands.
- Poor CRM leads to panic, and this is the final straw that breaks the camel's back.
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henge
Final Assembly Line stage 2
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Post by henge on Dec 3, 2015 9:24:25 GMT 1
One question pops into my mind here:
Modern aircraft are all fly-by-wire - pilots don't control the aircraft control systems directly anymore, but computers check every command before it's being executed. As I understand it, this should prevent the pilots from making "unsafe" maneuvers.
The instinct to pull up the nose when a stall warning occurs is something that happens again and again - although pilots should learn this on day 1 of their training.
Couldn't the flight computers be programmed to prevent exactly that? Or am I thinking too simple here - are there aspects that would make such a limitation of the pilot's "freedom" dangerous? Maybe someone more knowledgable can explain this.
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Post by Jkkw on Dec 3, 2015 9:45:17 GMT 1
One question pops into my mind here: Modern aircraft are all fly-by-wire - pilots don't control the aircraft control systems directly anymore, but computers check every command before it's being executed. As I understand it, this should prevent the pilots from making "unsafe" maneuvers. The instinct to pull up the nose when a stall warning occurs is something that happens again and again - although pilots should learn this on day 1 of their training. Couldn't the flight computers be programmed to prevent exactly that? Or am I thinking too simple here - are there aspects that would make such a limitation of the pilot's "freedom" dangerous? Maybe someone more knowledgable can explain this. On an Airbus, if everything is working properly this is what happens, there's flight envelope protection which prevents the pilot from not only flying outside the flight envelope but also prevents situations such as stalls and overspeed by changing the aircraft's pitch and thrust. This however only works when everything is working properly and if there's a problem such as erroneous airspeed (as was the case in AF447) the system changes to 'alternate law' where these protections are lost. Boeing's philosophy is that the pilot should have complete control of the aircraft and so does not have flight envelope protection (to my knowledge). www.airbusdriver.net/airbus_fltlaws.htm
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Post by airboche on Dec 3, 2015 9:58:22 GMT 1
Boeing has electronic support as well. Flight augmentation, tailstrike protection, flutter protection, engine ice removal, on top FBW for ailerons and spoilers and such. They even have the very same (used to be)-"Marconi"-chipset behind it that Airbus is using. However Boeing permits violent overrides if the pilot insists on trying something else. (No guarantee the a/c will remain intact doing so)
Away from the old A vs. B debate:
Would it be feasable to use available basic data to put in a "stabilize now"-knob or similar in the cockpit to bring the a/c straight and level in a second anytime just with let's say laser gyro data or something else that will remain available anytime even during emergencies? Modern fighters do have something like this.
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